The State between Internal and External Pressure: Exploring the Impact of Power Structures at Different Levels of Analysis on State Preference Formation with Regard to Foreign Policy by Alons, G.C.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/141513
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
ECPR Joint Sessions Granada 2005: Paper Gerry van der Kamp-Alons                                              1 
 
 
 
 
The State between Internal and External Pressure:  
 
Exploring the Impact of Power Structures at Different 
Levels of Analysis on State Preference Formation with 
Regard to Foreign Policy 
 
Gerry van der Kamp-Alons 
 
 
 
Paper for ECPR Joint Sessions 
Granada, 14-19 April 2005 
Workshop: Foreign Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice 
 
(Draft! – Work in Progress! Please do not quote without permission) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gerry van der Kamp-Alons, PhD Student 
Department of Political Science,  Radboud University of Nijmegen 
Thomas van Aquinostraat 5, PO Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
Tel: +31 24 3612252, Fax: +31 24 3612379, E-mail: g.vanderkamp@fm.ru.nl 
  
ECPR Joint Sessions Granada 2005: Paper Gerry van der Kamp-Alons                                              2 
Introduction and overview 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that in order to understand the behaviour of states in international 
relations, we need to take both the structure of the international system and the domestic 
environment of states into account: Janus looks both ways. Important as this acknowledgement 
may be, the field of international relations still lacks a sufficient body of theoretical research on 
the interaction between the external and internal environments, and preference-formation in 
particular is still a neglected field of research in the study of Foreign Policy. Although neo-
realists and neo-institutionalists admit that we need to link domestic politics with international 
relations and foreign policy analysts focusing on domestic politics acknowledge the importance 
of the international system in explaining foreign policy, both strands of literature do not seem to 
genuinely communicate and each follows its own stream in trying to explain state action; the 
former emphasizing external determinants of state action and the latter emphasizing internal 
(domestic) determinants of state action. In this paper, we aim at exploring the conditions 
influencing the relative impact of the internal (domestic) and external (international) environment 
on the formulation of state-preferences on foreign policy. We seek to arrive at hypotheses on the 
conditions under which states will give precedence to either the incentives arising from the 
domestic environment or to the incentives arising from the international environment, when 
forming their preferences on foreign policy. 
 In this paper, we will combine international and domestic explanations of state 
preferences. We are guided by a three-dimensional view on a state’s internal interests (interests of 
the government in the domestic system) and its external interests (interests of the state in the 
international system), incorporating political, economic and ideological aspects. Two variables 
are of central importance: the structure of the international system (polarity) on the one hand, and 
the structure of the domestic system (state-society relations) on the other hand. The effects these 
two power structures from different levels of analysis are likely to have on state preference 
formation on foreign policy will be theoretically explored. We will argue that different 
combinations of these two structural power relations amplify and modify external and internal 
constraints differently. On the basis of the two structural variables expectations can be arrived at 
regarding the relative impact of the internal and external environment on state preferences. The 
theoretical model arrived at will be used to analyse preference-formation in Germany on the 
liberalization of trade in agricultural products during the Uruguay Round of GATT-negotiations. 
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 In Section 1 we will start by providing a short overview of the relevant IR literature and 
the policy field of empirical research will be introduced. Section two focuses on the basis 
assumptions underlying this research paper and elaborates on the three dimensions of a state’s 
interest. The focus of Section 3 is the internal environment. We will explore the consequences of 
the internal polarity for the relative impact of the internal and external environment on 
preference-formation and elaborate on internal process variables influencing the process of 
preference-formation. In Section 4 the role of external polarity and external process variables in 
preference-formation will be discussed. Finally, Section 5 will apply the theoretical model 
developed in sections 2-4 to German preference-formation on the agricultural aspect of the 
Uruguay Round between 1990 and 1993. 
 
1. State of the art/relevant IB theory and introduction of the policy field 
Current approaches in political science which try to explain state preferences and behaviour, tend 
to focus either on the external (international) environment as the explanatory variable or – and 
that is what happens most of the time – exclusively on the domestic (national) environment to 
explain national preferences, neglecting the external-internal interaction. Without going into too 
much detail, it can be stated that neo-realism (e.g. Waltz 1979, Grieco 1990), neo-institutionalism 
(Keohane and Nye 1989, Keohane 1984) and the second-image reversed literature (for an 
overview see Almond 1989) clearly focus on the external environment as the explanatory 
variable of state interests and behaviour: the structure of the international system and the role of 
international institutions are explanatory factors of great importance in this literature. In contrast, 
Foreign Policy Analysis which focuses on domestic politics (for an overview see Haney et al 
1995) emphasize internal variables like public opinion, domestic institutions and interest group 
pressure as factors explaining a state’s foreign policy preferences and behaviour. The systemic 
factors emphasized by neo-realists and neo-institutionalists do not suffice to account for all state 
actions, as they admit themselves. At the same time, foreign policy explanations solely focusing 
on domestic politics also run into trouble when confronted with empirical reality. This does not 
imply that all these approaches may be discarded, but it indicates that we need to take account of 
both systemic factors ánd domestic politics in order to explain state preferences.  
There are a number of approaches which, either explicitly or implicitly, focus on the 
interaction between the internal and the external environment. A first example is Putnam’s two-
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level games (Putnam 1988). However, these two-level games aim at explaining negotiations and 
its outcomes and not at explaining the process of national preference-formation which takes place 
before the actual international negotiations. Secondly, neoclassical realists should be mentioned 
here. Neoclassical realists argue that world leaders can be constrained by both international and 
domestic politics. The incentives and pressures arising from the international system, according 
to them, are ‘are translated through unit-level intervening variables such as decision-maker’s 
perceptions’ (Rose 1998, 152). So, ultimately they treat systemic incentives as the independent 
variable and internal factors as intervening variables. Although this already is a great step 
forward from neo-realism, we would argue that both external variables and internal variables 
should be treated as independent variables in explaining foreign policy preferences. The question 
then becomes under which conditions either internal or external factors are likely to weigh more 
heavily in the process of preference-formation. 
There is one approach which implicitly answers this question on the expected relative 
impact of the internal and external environment on state preferences and behaviour: the domestic 
structure approach. This approach argues that a state’s internal structure (i.e. state-society 
relations, which can be placed on a continuum between state-dominated and society-dominated) 
influences the degree to which a government can be expected to take account of societal pressure 
or the degree to which the government is insulated from societal pressure and hence able to take 
account of external considerations (Katzenstein 1976, 1978; Risse-Kappen, 1991, 1995)1. The 
presumption is that a government in a state with a society-centered structure will be more easily 
influenced by societal actors than a government in a state with a more state-dominated structure. 
The latter is to a larger degree insulated from societal pressure and can hence take more account 
of considerations induced by the external environment. However, this approach seems to lack 
explanatory power when confronted with certain empirical observations: and that is the ‘puzzle’ 
that instigated this research project. Many authors on European governance observe that 
agricultural organizations both in France and in Germany are able to dominate the national 
positions in the European Council of Ministers and often succeed in stalling reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or agricultural trade liberalization in the context of the 
GATT/WTO (Philips 1990, 140; Goverde 2000, 262; Keeler 1996; 128; Risse-Kappen 1995, 12; 
George and Bache 2000, 153, 167, 306). These empirical observations that agricultural groups 
                                                 
1 In Section 3, I will provide indicators on the basis of which state-society relations may be defined. 
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both in Germany and in France dominated the decision-making concerning their state’s 
negotiating position with respect to negotiations on trade in agricultural products in the European 
and international context do not correspond with the theoretical expectations based on the 
domestic structure approach. This approach cannot explain the similarity in outcome (dominance 
of the internal environment) in both France and Germany, since the domestic structures of these 
countries are assumed to be dissimilar2. Clearly, domestic structure, although a good indicator for 
the structural power relations between state and society, does not sufficiently explain the relative 
impact of the internal and external environment in the process of national preference formation. 
Nevertheless, it may be used as a starting point to which external structure and process variables 
can be added, as will be done in section 3 and 4. 
 
The lack of current theoretical approaches to take into account the simultaneous importance of 
the external and internal environment and the interaction between the two in order to explain 
national preference formation is very unfortunate, especially if one wants to explain state 
preferences concerning issues with both important internal and external dimensions. The subject 
of our research project – preference formation in France and Germany on the mandate for the 
European Commission in GATT-negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization - concerns an 
issue area par excellence (the field of external agricultural trade) in which both external and 
internal dimensions are potentially of great importance. On the one hand, domestic groups 
pressure the government to take actions – often protectionist – which are in their advantage, and 
try to stall trade liberalization when it is not in their interest. On the other hand, the national 
political and economic interest as a whole may be better served by trade liberalization, and both 
their membership of international organizations and pressure exerted by foreign states can induce 
the state to cooperate in trade liberalization. Explaining national preference formation on the 
negotiating mandate for the Commission in GATT/WTO negotiations, therefore, requires 
analysis of incentives arising from both a state’s internal and its external environment. France and 
Germany are extremely interesting cases for investigating the relative impact of internal and 
external pressure on state preferences. Whereas great-power states are relatively less constrained 
by the external structure and small-power states are regarded not important enough for other 
                                                 
2 State-society relations are generally considered to be society-dominated in Germany and state-dominated in France 
( e.g. Katzenstein 1978: 323-234; Risse-Kappen, 1991: 492, 504: Krasner, 1978: 58, Mastanduno et al 1989: 470: 
Skidmore 1993; 207: Zysman 1977: 852: Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993: 34: Van der Vleuten 2001: 87). 
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states to worry about their behaviour, increasing the likeliness that both will be able to base their 
preferences on internal considerations, middle-power states (like France and Germany) are 
neither powerful enough to resist the constrains of the international system nor weak enough to 
be left alone by others. As a result, it is most undecided in middle-power states whether the 
external or internal incentives will weigh most heavily in the process of preference-formation 
within these states, which makes them most interesting for investigation. 
 
 
2. Basic assumptions and State interests 
 
2.1. Assumptions  
 
We take the State as the central actor in this study. This choice corresponds with our research 
aim, which is to gain an understanding of the process of national preference formation on foreign 
(trade) policy. When it comes to decision-making within the GATT, only states can actually 
decide whether or not to reach a certain agreement. Within the hierarchical domestic system, the 
government has a privileged position, which provides it with a central role when it comes to 
aggregating domestic preferences. We assume that eventually the State will consider and balance 
its internal and external interests and decide on the national preference that will be defended in 
the international arena.We further assume that actors are rational. This means that an actor 
decides as if he has ordered the expected outcomes of the behavioural options subjectively 
available to him on the basis of the utility he attaches to these outcomes. He is assumed to be 
utility maximizing and thus to prefer the option with the highest expected utility attached to it.  
  
2.2. State interests 
We assume that the interest of the State3 is to survive. As a consequence the preference ordering 
of behavioural alternatives depends on the expected effects of the different behavioural 
alternatives on the survival of the State, which defines the utility attached to these alternatives. 
We distinguish between three dimensions within the interest of survival: a political, economic 
and ideological dimension (see also Van der Vleuten 2001, 50; and Bull1977, 1995ed, p 63). 
                                                 
3 In the rest of this paper, I distinguish between the State as an actor in the international system and the State as an 
actor in the domestic system. The former will be referred to as ‘state’, and the latter will be referred to as 
‘government’.  The term State is reserved for the state as a mental construct: the State who has to weigh its external 
(state) interests and its internal (governmental) interests in the process of preference-formation. 
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Furthermore, a distinction can be made between the external and the internal interests of the 
State, or between the interests of the state in the international system (State’s external interests) 
and the interests of the government in the domestic system (State’s internal interest). An 
overview of these different dimensions of a State’s internal and external interests is provided in 
table 1.  
 
Table 1: Dimension of the interests in survival of state and government 
 
EXTERNAL INTERNAL 
 
Political material interest 
Defending the power position of the state 
and preventing vulnerability of the state 
to other states.  
 
Political immaterial interest or 
reputational interest 
Defending the state’s credibility and its 
reputation. 
 
Political material interest 
Remaining in office (re-election) and 
defending the government’s position in 
relation to society. 
 
Political immaterial interest 
Defending the government’s credibility and 
reputation. 
 
Economic interest 
Striving for protectionism in non-
competitive sectors and liberalization in 
competitive sectors + maintaining a 
viable international trading system. 
 
Economic interest 
Maximizing national economic indicators: 
state budget, BNP, employment etc. 
 
Ideological interest 
Playing the ‘role’ the state wishes to play 
in the international system (e.g. vocation 
exportatrice). 
 
Ideological interest 
Defending principled beliefs and policy 
paradigm (instruments and policies). 
 
Aimed at defending the relative power 
position of the state in the international 
system 
 
Aimed at defending the position of the 
government and its ideology 
 
In the process of preference-formation, various behavioural options are considered on the basis of 
the different dimensions of the State’s interests. In terms of these interests, behavioural options 
can have three sorts of effects for each of these interests: 1. neutral/no effect; 2. positive effects; 
3. negative effects. In the first case, there are no consequences for preference formation. In the 
second case, the behavioural option would provide benefits in the sense that it contributes to the 
dimension of the State interest in question. In the third case, the behavioural option would 
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confront the State with costs in the sense that it is detrimental to the dimension of the State 
interest in question. For example, a behavioural option would be politically costly for the 
government when it is an option against which important societal groups mobilize their pressure. 
The option would be internally economically costly if it may be expected to result in increased 
unemployment. The government is then likely to decide against this specific behavioural option. 
The consideration of the effects of different behavioural options for the State’s interests and the 
ordering of behavioural options in which these considerations results, is actually the process of 
preference-formation.4 This also implies that when the costs and benefits attached to different 
behavioural options change, preferences will change as well. Sections 3 and 4 will elaborate on 
internal/domestic factors and external/international factors respectively, which can lead to a 
change in the costs and benefits attached to different behavioural options and therefore to a 
change in preferences. 
 The different dimensions of interests can be mutually supportive, but they may also be 
contradictory, both within one column and between the external and internal columns. With 
respect to a state’s interest, the political dimension may be regarded prior to the economic and 
ideological dimension, because political (and military) security is a prerequisite for a state to be 
able to strive for economic and ideological goals. Therefore, in relation to preferences on trade 
policy, I assume that a state aims at maximizing economic benefits (by striving for the 
maintenance of protection in non-competitive sectors and for trade liberalization in competitive 
sectors)5 as long as this does not compromise its political material interest.  
Domestically, the government’s political interest may be considered dominant, assuming 
that the government, first of all, strives for reelection. The government can therefore be expected 
to have relatively short time-horizons. However, in situations where the government can be 
                                                 
4 In appendix 1 we provide an elaboration on and operationalisations of the different dimensions of state and 
governmental interests. These operationalisations are used in the analysis of the case study: Germany 1990-1993 
(section 5). 
5 On the basis of trade theory, it could be argued that it would be in a state’s economic interest to strive for free trade 
in all sectors, for that would provide most economic benefits (for producers, consumers and taxpayers) for all states 
in the very long run. However, this would only work provided that states want to and are able to adapt themselves to 
the new total free-trade situation, and if cheating could be prohibited. Since these criteria are not likely to be met, for 
political reasons, it is justifiable to assume that a state’s economic interest lies in maximizing economic benefits and 
that this can be achieved through striving for protection in  non-competitive sectors and for trade liberalization in 
competitive sectors. Even within the GATT trade regime in which states share the goal of trade liberalization, trade 
negotiations ultimately deal with dividing the ‘profit-pie’ of liberalization. The international trading system itself 
may be a collective good, but the benefits from (free) trade can be considered to be worth fighting over. (See also 
Conybeare (1984, 8-9) who argues that the benefits from free trade are largely excludable, and the consumptions of 
some benefits from trade (e.g. maximizing exports) are subject to rivalry.) 
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expected to be less constrained by its political interest – e.g. due to low societal mobilization or a 
strong structural power position of the government in relation to society6- the government is most 
likely to base its preferences on its ideological interest, for this would lead to policy options in 
line with its principled beliefs, policy paradigm and government programme. The government’s 
short time-horizon and the importance it attaches to reelection, combined with the fact that the 
process of preference-formation is eventually a domestic policy-process, increases the likeliness 
that domestic considerations will generally precede over external considerations in the process of 
preference-formation. Therefore, in Section 3, we will first turn to internal structural and process 
variables which affect preference-formation. Nevertheless, since we believe (as argued above) 
that external considerations must also be regarded of importance – especially in the area of trade 
liberalization – we will also focus on external structure and process variables which can influence 
preference formation. This will be the subject of Section 4. 
 
 
3. The domestic environment: internal polarity and the process of preference-
formation 
 
We assume that the State is the central actor in the process of preference formation, and 
ultimately decides on the national preference that will be defended in the international arena. In 
the process of preference-formation these preferences are formed by considering the effects 
(costs and benefits) of policy options for the different State interests. The following section will 
focus on internal or domestic factors influencing the national preference formation. First, the 
effects of the structural variable of internal polarity on preference-formation (e.g. on the degree to 
which either internal or external considerations are likely to weigh more heavily) will be 
explored. Secondly, we will focus on process variables which, in the process of preference 
formation, may intervene between the expectations based on the structural variable and the actual 
outcome. 
  
3.1. Internal polarity7 
                                                 
6 State-society relations and mobilization will be elaborated in Section 3. 
7 A number of authors argue that another structural variable, the degree of state intervention, influences the degree to 
which the government is susceptible to societal constraints (e.g. Nordlinger 1981, 21; Lieshout 1995, 193-195). 
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The structural variable of internal polarity refers to the division of power (structural power 
relations) between government and society8; the higher this polarity, the more these power 
relations are in the advantage of the government. The higher the structural capability of the 
government is to impose its will on other domestic actors (or to follow its preferences against the 
will of these domestic actors) the higher is the internal polarity (Van der Vleuten 2001, 39). In 
terms of the different governmental interests, this implies that the government is less politically 
constrained in the process of preference formation and is likely to attach more weight to its 
economic and ideological interests. Moreover, due to the large room of manoeuvre for the 
government internally, the State is also likely to be better able to take account of its external 
interests in the process of preference- formation. The weight a state attaches to its external 
interests is therefore likely to increase with higher internal polarity. I use three institutional 
factors to estimate the structural power relations between government and society (internal 
polarity)9: 1. The degree to which governmental power is centralized; 2. Power relations between 
government and parliament; 3. The system of interest representation. I will now discuss each 
separately. 
 
A. The degree to which governmental power is centralized. 
 
Essentially, this is about the question whether power is centralized at the top, or, in contrast, 
dispersed, indicating the degree to which the central government can take autonomous action.10  
The sharing of power or competencies results in a great dispersal of decision sites and makes 
states highly permeable to domestic groups (Nordlinger 1981, 183; Rogowski 1999, 133).The 
degree to which decision making power is centralized within the central government is also of 
importance, for decentralization of power within the government leads to more access points 
within the government (government leaders and ministries) for societal actors who wish to 
                                                                                                                                                              
However, state intervention particularly influences the degree to which societal mobilization can be expected: the 
extent to which mobilization is likely to produce political costs and, in effect, constrains the government, depends on 
the internal polarity of the state (van der Vleuten 2001, 37). 
8 With the term ‘society’, I refer not only to societal groups, but also to the parliament and political parties. 
9 It is common usage to use the term ‘state’-society relations, but I will use the term ‘government’-society relations 
in order to use the distinction I made between state and government consequently. 
10 Factors which may be used to operationalize the degree of centralization are the presence or absence of federalism, 
bicameralism, an independent central bank (Lijphart 1999, 3-4), possibility and use of referendums and 
parliamentary vs. presidential government (Huber, Rogin and Stephen 1993, 728). 
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influence national preferences.11 A high degree of centralization contributes to a high internal 
polarity, whereas decentralization or dispersion of power is associated wit lower internal polarity. 
Decentralization imposes institutional constraints on the government - veto-positions or veto-
points in the words of Schmidt (1996, 386) – which negatively affects the power of the 
government over society.  
 
B. Executive-legislative relations 
 
Executive-legislative relations may be characterized either by executive dominance12, or by an 
executive-legislative balance13. The former leads to a higher polarity and the latter to a lower 
polarity. When relations are executive dominated, the government can more easily act against the 
wishes of parliament (as long as it has the support of its own party), whereas parliament may be 
an important veto-power in case of an executive-legislative balance. Parliament is then likely to 
be able to exert influence in the process of national preference formation (cf Milner 1997, 19). 
Moreover, societal groups are likely to try to influence government through parliament as an 
intermediary organization. In case of executive dominance this parliamentary pathway will be 
less effective and societal groups are more likely to direct their lobbying activities at the 
government itself. 
 
C. Method of interest representation 
 
The degree to which interest representation is institutionalized indicates the degree to which 
societal groups are formally provided with a role in decision making. Indicators of the degree of 
institutionalism are the institutionalized input in the policy process through formal access and 
seats in commissions; the legal recognition of privileged groups; and the number of groups with 
privileged access. The degree of institutionalization may be low (indicating a pluralist method of 
interest representation), intermediate (indicating a structured pluralist/weak corporatist method 
                                                 
11 The degree to which decision-making power is centralized within the central government can also be related to the 
role bureaucratic politics is likely to play in the process of preference formation. As decision-making power on a 
particular issue is shared between more departments/ministers (decentralization), bureaucratic politics (in the sense 
of strife between departments which each have their own interests) is likely to play a larger role in the process of 
preference formation. 
12 Executive dominance is often associated with presidential governments as opposed to parliamentary governments 
(Lijphart 1999, 117). However, I regard executive dominance also to be present when the government is a one-party 
majority government (with a stable majority in parliament). 
13 Minority governments and coalition governments lead to an executive-legislative balance. 
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of interest representation, and high (indicating a corporatist method of interest intermediation). A 
higher degree of institutionalization of interest representation may be associated with a lower 
polarity. The power relations between government and groups are more advantageous to groups 
in a corporatist network. They are able to influence national preferences through their formal 
access to decision-making processes and they do not have to compete with rival groups within 
their sector. Moreover, corporatism is commonly associated with a culture of consensual policy 
making and compromise (Van Waarden 1992, 47-48). Groups in a pluralist network are weak as 
a result of their lack of formal access, and because the ‘presence of several competing interests 
could in principle mean that they will prevent one another from realizing their interests directly’ 
(Van Waarden 1992, 44), which provides the state with increased room of manoeuvre (see 
Nordlinger 1981, 157; and Culpepper 1993, 306 for a similar argument). 
 
Taking together the ‘scores’ of a state on these indicators we can establish whether the internal 
polarity in a particular state is low (society-dominated domestic structure), intermediate 
(government-society balance) or high (government-dominated domestic structure).14As already 
stated above, internal polarity has consequences for the process of national preference formation. 
When polarity is low, the government’s structural position in relation to society is weak and the 
State therefore has to take societal preferences into account when deciding on the preference to 
be defended in the international system. Moreover, under low internal polarity, power relations 
are instable from the viewpoint of the government. The government is therefore likely to attach 
relatively more weight to its short term interests as a result of which the governmental political 
interest will be considered of relatively more importance than the governmental economic and 
ideological interests in the process of preference formation. Finally, since low internal polarity 
indicates heavy internal political constrains on the government, the State is less likely to be able 
to take account of its external interests in the process of preference formation. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The lower the internal polarity, the more weight a State is likely to attach 
to its internal interests (especially the political interest) and the less likely the State is to 
be able to take account of its external interests in the process of preference-formation. 
                                                 
14 A non-institutional factor which also influences the structural power relations between government and society 
(internal polarity), is the degree of governmental and societal unity. Situations in which the government is more 
united than society, contribute to the structural power of the government in relation to society, and thus to a higher 
internal polarity. Alternatively, situations in which society is more united than the government, contribute to the 
structural power of society in relation to the government, and thus to a lower internal polarity. 
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Hypothesis 2: The higher the internal polarity, the less weight a State is likely to attach to 
its internal political interest relative to its internal economic and ideological interest and 
the more likely the State is to be able to take account of its external interests in the 
process of preference-formation. 
 
3.2. The process of preference formation 
 
The internal structure of the state provides information on the structural power relations between 
government and society and therefore about the government’s general ability to act contrary to 
societal demands, or about the general ability of society to influence their government. In case of 
a high internal polarity, society can be expected to need to exert much more pressure in order to 
influence the government than in case of low polarity.15 The internal structure, however, does not 
determine the behaviour of government or society; it only enables and constrains.16 A number of 
factors arising in the process of preference formation are of importance as well, because they 
may intervene between the expectations purely based on the internal structure and the actual 
outcome of the process of preference-formation. In the remainder of this section we will first 
focus on a number of variables which are particularly related to the chances of influence of 
societal actors in the process of preference-formation. Secondly, we will turn to the question how 
changes in State preferences can be explained by (changes in) internal variables. 
 
3.2.1. Mobilization, group resources and governmental sensitivity 
 
The factors of mobilization, resources and governmental sensitivity can be related to the internal 
political costs and benefits attached to different behavioural options in the process of preference-
formation. Mobilization is both a prerequisite for societal influence and a variable of which an 
increase in intensity is likely to result in an increase in the production of internal political costs 
and benefits for the government, enhancing societal influence. A certain amount of issue salience 
is required in order for societal actors to mobilize in favour of or against a certain policy 
proposal. The policy proposal must affect them either because it provides huge benefits or 
because it would induce high costs for them (Milner 1997, 63). As long as societal mobilization 
                                                 
15 Skidmore and Hudson (1993, 7-8) reach a similar conclusion when stating that as a state is strong and insulated, 
then societal opposition can be ignored, ‘at least until it reaches very high levels’. 
16 In line with Putnam’s two-level games, a government that has a weak power position in relation to society may 
choose to fight for another preference in the international arena than the preference that would be based on the 
national political costs and benefits, if this other preference would entail a policy that would strengthen the 
government’s position in relation to society (see also Van der Vleuten 2001, 55-56). 
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is unidirectional, increased mobilization may be expected to lead to an increase in societal 
influence. However, once mobilization becomes multidirectional, indicating lack of unity on the 
part of society, this may be expected to be detrimental to the influence of society in the process of 
preference-formation, because disunity on the part of society increases the government’s room 
for manoeuvre.17 
 The more resources a group has at its disposal the more likely this group will be able to 
mobilize and influence the process of preference-formation by effectively producing internal 
political costs and benefits. These resources may be financial means, degree of membership and 
privileged access to governmental institutions (Van der Vleuten 2001, 53). Also, foreign support 
may be regarded as a resource for societal groups which is likely to increase the effectiveness of 
their mobilization. Foreign support can for example take the form of material or ideological 
resources foreign states or groups may provide for the domestic group. Further, foreign groups or 
states can also provide foreign support by exerting similar pressure as the domestic societal 
group, resulting in the ‘sandwiching’ of the State. 
 When the government is more sensitive, it will attach greater importance to its internal 
political interests and is thereby likely to be more easily influenced by societal pressure in the 
process of preference-formation. The sensitivity of a government to societal pressure varies. A 
government is more sensitive to pressure from the support groups of the political party(ies) the 
government consists of. Also, sensitivity increases if the government has a weak position in 
parliament and when elections are near (Van der Vleuten 2001, 53). 
 
Hypothesis 3: The internal political costs and benefits society is able to confront the 
government with in the process of preference-formation, is likely to increase with rising 
levels of mobilization and societal resources. 
 
Hypothesis 4: As the sensitivity of the government increases, the State is more likely to 
take account of its internal political interests in the process of preference-formation. 
 
3.2.2. How to explain changes in preferences on the basis of internal variables 
 
As we already stated earlier, preference-formation means that the State considers the 
consequences (cost and benefits) of various behavioural options for its interests and orders the 
                                                 
17 Societal pressure especially tends to become multidirectional when an issue becomes politicized, by which we 
mean that it becomes salient to more groups, including groups from outside the issue area which may have different 
interest. 
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behavioural options accordingly. This implies that preferences are likely to change when the 
costs and benefits attached to the different behavioural options change. As a result, a change in 
any variable that influences costs and benefits may cause a change in preferences. Changes in the 
variables elaborated above – internal polarity, mobilization (intensity and direction), resources, 
and governmental sensitivity – may therefore cause a change in State preferences by their effect 
on the internal political costs and benefits attached to different policy options. For example, if 
societal pressure (mobilization) at t=0 was directed against trade liberalization in the agricultural 
area and in favour of safeguarding the income of farmers, but at t=1 societal pressure is mainly in 
favour of trade liberalization (possibly at the cost of farm interests), then the high internal 
political costs attached to trade liberalization at t=0 make place for high internal political benefits 
for trade liberalization at t=1, which (ceteris paribus) is likely to result in a change in State 
preferences. Of course, a change in the direction of mobilization may especially be expected to 
result in a change in State preferences when internal polarity is low. 
 Apart from the variables mentioned in section 3.2.1. a number of other variables need to 
be mentioned: the government’s policy paradigm or goals and the balance of preferences within 
the government. Changes in these variables can also result in changes in State preferences. The 
government’s policy paradigm or goals are the basis on which different policy options are 
evaluated. If the government regards export subsidies as an important policy instrument, then a 
policy proposal which would imply a prohibition of these subsidies would be ideologically 
costly. The government is then likely not to prefer this policy proposal. However, if the 
government’s policy paradigm or goals were to change in the sense that export subsidies are no 
longer a preferred method of intervention, then the government may be expected to prefer the 
policy proposal, which is now not ideologically costly anymore. Clearly, a change in the 
government’s policy paradigm or goals can lead to a change in preferences because it changes the 
costs and benefits attached to different policy options. A change in the government’s policy 
paradigm or goals is most likely to be caused by a change in (the composition of) government 
(e.g. after elections or ministerial reshuffles) or by a change in the power relations within the 
government. Also, changes in the economic situation (stagnation, recession) can lead to a change 
in governmental priorities and goals. Safeguarding employment may then be regarded more 
important than safeguarding the income of farmers for example. 
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 The balance of preferences within the government is also of importance in the process of 
preference-formation. Assuming that the government is the central actor within the domestic 
environment who considers its own preferences in relation to the preferences of other actors in 
deciding on the national preference that will be fought for in the international arena, clearly the 
governmental preferences themselves are of importance in the process of preference-formation. 
The government consists of a government-leader and a number of ministers, who do not always 
agree on what the best policy option would be. A number of ministers may be in favour of trade 
liberalization in all sectors, whereas other ministers would advocate protection in specific sectors. 
The difference in opinion can be explained by the fact that different ministers have different 
interests: the Foreign Affairs minister wishes to secure good relations with other states; the 
Economics minister advocates trade liberalization; and the Agriculture minister wants to protect 
its clientele – the farmers – and is therefore more likely to oppose trade liberalization. The 
difference of opinion within the government is especially likely to have important consequences 
when the division of power within the cabinet is decentralized, implying that more ministers are 
involved in the same issue area. Under these circumstances bureaucratic politics18 is likely to 
play a great role in the process of preference formation. When the preferences of various 
ministers differ, this may then result in internal bureaucratic fights before a decision is taken on 
the national stance in the international arena. If most of the (powerful) ministers advocate 
protection in the specific issue area of agricultural trade, then this is the preference that is likely 
to be defended in the international arena as the balance of preferences tends towards 
protectionism. Changes in this balance of preferences may then lead to changes in the preferences 
which are defended in the international arena. This begs the question of what causes the balance 
of preferences within the government to change. Changes in the composition of the government 
or changes in the power relations within the government (which could be an effect of the change 
in the composition of the government) are most likely to be the cause of a change in the balance 
of preferences within the government. Further, a change in the balance may also be caused by 
one or more ministers changing their preference on the issue at hand. 
 Finally, a change in the government’s causal beliefs – the relationship the government 
believes to exist between certain means and ends (cause-effect relations)– may also lead to a 
                                                 
18 For more information on Bureaucratic Politics see Allison’s classical work Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban missile crisis. 
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change in the cost and benefits attached to the different behavioural options, which may result in 
a change in preferences. To give an example, the government could at t=0 believe that export 
subsidies provide increased income for national producers and therefore use export subsidies as a 
central element of its trade policy. If the government were to alter this causal belief at t=1 in the 
sense that it no longer believes that export subsides support the income of national producers, but 
that they mainly provide benefits for the importing countries, then the benefits which had been 
attached to the policy of export subsidies at t=0 are not attached to it anymore at t=1. The 
government can then be expected to prefer other trade instruments over export subsidies. Here we 
see the potential link between changes in causal beliefs and a change in the government’s policy 
paradigm and goals. This still leaves us with the question of how these changes in causal beliefs 
or cause-effect relations can be explained. First of all, the changes could be the effect of a change 
in the composition of the government. However, the government may also have been convinced 
by other actors, either internal actors like societal groups or external actors like foreign states or 
groups, that the cause-effect relation it believed to exist was not correct. These groups could 
argue their claim by providing the government with relevant information and thereby persuade 
the government to alter its causal beliefs. Figure 1 gives an overview of the process-variables 
elaborated above and the relation between these variables. 
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Figure 1: Internal variables affecting the process of preference formation: changes in these may lead to changes in preferences 
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4. The international environment: external polarity and the process of 
preference-formation/ external process variables 
 
4.1. External Polarity 
The structure of the international system ‘constrains and enables’ (Waltz 1979, 74). It constrains 
the range of options available to a state and the costs and benefits attached to different 
behavioural options. It therefore influences the calculation of national preferences. Two structural 
characteristiscs are of importance here: the principle by which the system is ordered and the 
polarity of the system (distribution of capabilities). 
 In contrast with the hierarchical ordering of the domestic system, anarchy is the principle 
by which the international system is ordered. This means that the international system of states 
lacks a central authority preventing others from breaking agreements or using violence. The 
consequence of anarchy is that the international system is a system of self-help. Since we assume 
that a state, above all, wants to survive, the structure of anarchy leads to the conclusion that a 
state has to take care of its own survival (see Waltz 1979, 107). The more capabilities (political, 
economic and ideological) a state possesses, the better it can be expected to be able to ensure its 
survival, as these capabilities ‘permit a state to induce changes it desires in the behaviour of other 
states or to resist what it views as undesirable changes in its own behaviour sought by others’ 
(Grieco 1990, 93). This also means that states cannot afford not to worry about their relative 
power position (which is based on their relative capabilities): states are interested in safeguarding 
or increasing their power position, because it enhances their chances of survival in the 
international system.19 Trade liberalization may affect the relative power position of states. 
Economic gains from trade liberalization are, in general, not distributed equally: international 
trade agreements affect the economic resources of various states differently and thereby may 
affect the relative power positions of states (Gowa 1989, 1243; Grieco 1990). 
 Where internal polarity indicated the power-relations between government and society in 
the domestic system, external polarity is about the power-relations between states in the 
                                                 
19 Neo-realists and neo-institutionalists debate on the degree to which the state’s interest to safeguard its power 
position leads to a sensitivity to gaps in gains and therefore induces states to strive for relative gains instead of 
absolute gains (Grieco 1988, 1990, 1993; Keohane 1993). A search for relative gains would imply that a state would 
only prefer trade liberalization if it expects to gain more from liberalization than its trading partners. We believe that 
states may indeed be sensitive to gaps in gains, but we will argue that this sensitivity is not a constant, and depends 
on the interaction capacity (see section 4.2.1.). 
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international system. These power relations are based on the division of capabilities (e.g. national 
income, military power, demographic characteristics). Polarity refers to the degree to which 
power is concentrated within the states system. Polarity increases as the capabilities in a system 
are distributed more unequally (Lieshout 1999a, 18). On the basis of the distribution of 
capabilities, one can distinguish between multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar systems, all within an 
anarchic system. The polarity of the international system impacts on the national preference 
formation of States through its relation to the stability of the international system.20 
 Bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems. As Waltz, for example, argues: 
the virtue of the ‘inequality of states’ is that it ‘makes peace and stability possible’ (Waltz 1979, 
132). In bipolar systems, both superpowers have their own sphere of influence they want to 
protect against the influence of the other superpower. The two superpowers provide a check on 
each other’s behaviour, discouraging behaviour that would be likely to bring them into conflict 
with each other and which could lead to their mutual destruction. This internal balancing reduces 
the chances of arbitrary behaviour on the side of the superpowers and makes their behaviour 
more predictable, reducing uncertainty in the international system. Moreover, if conflicts arise 
between states, they are likely to be limited in extent and duration, and intervention of one of the 
superpowers is likely to end the conflict. As a result, a bipolar system (and the position of states 
within this system) is relatively stable. Multipolar systems, in which capabilities are divided more 
equally, are relatively instable. A multipolar system is likely to be characterized by shifting 
alliances and lack of a superpower which is able to intervene in and end conflicts on its own. 
Moreover, as the system now lacks the internal balancing between superpowers, the behaviour of 
the greater powers within a multipolar system is less predictable and the system less stable. 
 The effects of variation in this stability on preference-formation on foreign policy are 
two-fold. First, it is likely to affect the relative importance a state attaches to its political, 
economic and ideological interests. As the stability of the international system increases, the 
discounting of future gains in the calculation of national preferences decreases. In other words, 
                                                 
20 In the remainder of this paper the focus will be on bipolar and multipolar systems and on middle-sized powers, 
because the empirical part of this research project focuses on preference formation in France and Germany (middle-
sized powers) during the Uruguay Round (1986-1993: bipolarity up to 1990 and multipolarity between 1990 and 
1993). In the beginning of the 1990s in was unclear whether the international system was unipolar, with the US as 
hegemon, or multipolar. Even in 1999, authors still contributed to the discussion on the future of the state system and 
the likeliness of a unipolar or multipolar system to arise (see for example Hout en Lieshout, 1999). Since it was most 
of all a period of uncertainty, we feel that multipolarity would be the best way to classify the system between 1990 
and 1993. 
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long term benefits are valued higher in a stable system than in an instable system. A relatively 
stable system is therefore likely to increase the value a state attaches to its economic and 
ideological interests (which are more long-term than its political interests). Secondly, variation in 
the stability of the international system affects the weight a State is likely to attach to its external 
interests and the State’s ability to take account of its internal interests in the process of 
preference-formation. In an uncertain and instable external environment, a state is more 
constrained than in a stable external environment. Its position in an instable system is more 
uncertain, as a consequence of which the state is more concerned about its relative position. The 
probability then increases that the State will give precedence to its external interests and that the 
State is less likely to be able to pay attention to domestic politics and its internal interest. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The lower the external polarity (= the more instable the international 
system and the less secure the position of a state in this system) the more weight a State is 
likely to attach to its external interests (especially the political interests) and the less the 
state is likely to take account of its internal interests in the process of preference-
formation. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The higher the external polarity (= the more stable the international 
system and the more secure the position of a state in the system) the less constrained a 
State is likely to be by the external environment and the more a State is likely to be able 
to take account of its internal interests in the process of preference-formation. 
 
 
4.2. External process variables and preference-formation 
 
A number op external process variables are of importance, because they may intervene between 
the expectations purely based on the external structure and the actual outcome of the process of 
preference-formation. In the remainder of this section we will first focus on the interaction 
capacity of the international system and how it affects preference-formation. Subsequently, a 
number of variables are treated which are particularly related to the effect of third state pressure 
(or the pressure of international organizations) in the process of preference-formation. Finally, we 
will turn to the question how changes in State preferences can be explained by (changes in) 
external variables. 
 
4.2.1. Interaction capacity 
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The interaction capacity of the international system influences ‘conditions of interactions’ 
(Buzan, Jones and Little 1993, 70) for all states and thereby defines the expected degree, intensity 
and velocity of interactions between states. The interaction capacity of the system is determined 
by the evolution of technology (weapons technology, communication, transport and information) 
and the density of shared norms and institutions (Buzan Jones and Little 1993, 69-71; Van der 
Vleuten 2001, 35). The interaction capacity increases with innovations in technology and with 
increasing institutional density. International institutions may be defined as ‘related complexes of 
rules and norms’ ‘identifyable in space and time’ (Keohane 1989, 163; Keohane 1988, 383), and 
they may, for example, take the form of international organizations and regimes.21 Through their 
principles and rules, these institutions ‘reduce the range of expected behaviour of states’ 
(Keohane 1984, 97) and thereby reduce uncertainty. As a result, a higher interaction capacity 
leads to a more stable external environment by making the actions of other states more 
predictable, thereby reducing uncertainty. By stabilizing the external environment (and thereby 
the position of states within the system), an increasing interaction capacity may also be expected 
to reduce the sensitivity to gaps in relative gains.22 The interaction capacity filters the structural 
imperative of self-help to which relative gains concerns are related. When relative gains concerns 
for states are likely to decrease, States can be expected to be better able to turn their faces from 
the external environment to the internal or domestic environment in the process of preference-
formation. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The weight States attach to their internal interest relative to their external 
interests in the process of preference-formation is likely to increase with an increasing 
interaction capacity. 
 
 
4.2.2. Mobilization and state vulnerability  
                                                 
21 Although regimes and international organizations are both specific forms of institutions, international 
organizations can undertake a far wider range of activities than regimes, like goal-directed activities such as ‘raising 
money, promulgating policies, and making discretionary choices’ (Keohane 1988, 384 fn2). A regime may be 
defined as a ‘complex of rules and organizations, the core elements of which have been negotiated and explicitly 
agreed upon by states’ (Keohane 1988, 384 fn2; see also Keohane 1980, 132-133). Compared to the definition of 
Krasner who defines regimes as ‘principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area’ (Krasner 1982, 185), Keohane’s definition is more narrow. In his 
definition, the rules have to be negotiated and explicitly agreed upon by states. Keohane’s definition is more 
applicable in my research project, in which the international trade regime has an important role to play. The GATT 
clearly meets Keohane’s demands to classify as a regime. 
22 A higher interaction capacity also increases the likeliness that states will specialize, increasing economic 
interdependence between states, which is also likely to decrease states’ sensitivity to gaps in gains. 
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As societal groups pressure the government at the domestic level of analysis, foreign states and 
international organizations may pressure the state at the international level of analysis. Pressure 
by these actors on state A may for example take the form of voicing their preferences on the issue 
on which State A is forming its preference or issuing threats which are to be executed when state 
A fails to take a certain position. Just as in the domestic arena, an increase in the intensity of 
mobilization in the external arena is likely to result in increasing political costs for the state, 
enhancing the influence of foreign states.23 However, not every state is equally likely to influence 
state A. The vulnerability of the state (comparable to the sensitivity of the government in the 
domestic arena) affects the degree to which state A is likely to be influenced by the pressure of 
foreign states. Asymmetries in dependence-as-vulnerability24 between states have consequences 
for the interactions between these states. If state A is more vulnerable to state B than state B is 
vulnerable to state A25, then State A is likely to anticipate on B’s wishes and expected behaviour. 
This has an impact on the costs and benefits state A attaches to different behavioural options in 
the process of preference-formation. It is clearly in state A’s interest not to upset state B, for the 
reaction of state B (e.g. retaliation) could seriously damage State A’s external political and 
economic interests. If state A has a high degree of vulnerability to other states, then it is 
confronted with high external constraints, increasing the likeliness that State A attaches more 
weight to its external political interest than to its internal interests in the process of preference-
formation. Considerations regarding (the pressure of) international organizations are more likely 
to enter the process of preference-formation as these organizations have provided state A with 
more benefits in the past. The more benefits the organization has provided state A with in the 
past, the more important the maintenance of this organization is for state A. When such an 
                                                 
23 It should be noted that it does not require an actual direct influence attempt for a foreign state to influence state A. 
State A can also anticipate on the expected preferences or actions of a foreign state and order its preferences 
accordingly. This influence through anticipation is especially likely when state A is highly vulnerable to the foreign 
state. 
24 If state A exports a large part of its products to state B ánd state A  has no alternative export markets if state B 
were to close its market, then state A is vulnerable to state B. 
25 With respect to trade issues, the specific position of the state in the international system affects the states 
vulnerability. Due to their large domestic markets and lower export to production ratio’s, great powers are generally 
less dependent on the international export markets than middle-sized and small powers with smaller domestic 
markets and higher export to production ratio’s (cf. Krasner 1976, 320). As a consequence the behavioural 
alternative of unilateral protection would be costly for small powers (when other states retaliate), whereas it is less 
costly to great powers, since they generally have a smaller stake in the trading system and because their 
predominance in capabilities enables them to impose sanctions on others and to prevail in a potential trade war. 
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organization pressures state A to take a certain position by invoking organizational norms and 
rules, then this is likely to affect state A’s preferences. 
 
Hypothesis 8: As the vulnerability of a state to other states increases, this state is more 
likely to attach greater importance to its external political interest in the process of 
preference-formation. 
 
4.2.3. How to explain changes in preferences on the basis of external variables? 
As explained in section 3.2.2., preferences are likely to change when the costs and benefits 
attached to the different behavioural options change. As a result, a change in any variable that 
influences costs and benefits may cause a change in preferences. Changes in the variables 
elaborated above – external polarity (stability), interaction capacity, external mobilization 
(intensity and direction) and state vulnerability – may therefore cause a change in State 
preferences by their effect on the external costs and benefits attached to different policy options. 
Apart from these variables a number of other external variables need to be mentioned, as they 
may also affect preference-formation on foreign trade policy. Two important external variables 
are: the situation in/stability of the economic system and the relations with important (trading) 
partners. Changes in these variables are likely to change the government’s goals and priorities26 
which in turn affect the costs and benefits attached to different behavioural options, thus 
influencing preferences. It is thus important to keep in mind that the effect of changes in these 
external variables operates through its effect on the internal variable of the government’s goals 
and priorities: the process of preference-formation is after all a domestic process. When the 
economic situation in the international system deteriorates (e.g. recession, turmoil in trade 
markets), then the importance attached to the maintenance of the multilateral trading system is 
likely to increase (external economic consideration). Deterioration of the relations with important 
trading partners (especially when the state is vulnerable to these foreign states) is likely to 
increase the importance attached to the State’s external political interest of improving relations 
with such partners. Finally, a change in the role the state wishes to play in the international 
system, which implies a change in the basis on which external ideological costs and benefits of 
different policy options are determined, may lead to a change in preferences. 
                                                 
26 Note that as soon as governmental priorities and goals enter the analysis, the variables of composition of the 
government and power-relations within the government (Section 3.2.2.) take on importance again. The same goes for 
changes in governmental causal beliefs on cause-effect relations regarding external factors. 
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5. Case: Preferences on agriculture in the Uruguay Round: Germany 1990-
1993. 
 
5.1. The place of the case-study within the wider research project 
The case: Germany 1990-1993 is one of the four cases which will be analyzed in our research-
project. Since most of the empirical material collected so far was related to Germany between 
1990 and 1993, we chose to provide a preliminary analysis of that case in this paper. It needs to 
be noted that on the basis of this single case-study, the hypotheses formulated in Section 3 and 4 
cannot be tested, especially those focusing on the relative importance of internal and external 
considerations in the process of preference formation. The combination of the totality of the four 
cases will enable us to test these hypotheses properly. Nevertheless, a preliminary analysis of one 
of the cases will show how a three dimensional view on State interests and how the related 
variables which we expect to cause changes in preferences may be applied in empirical analysis. 
Table 2 shows the cases which have been selected on the basis of differentiation on the two 
structural variables of external polarity and internal polarity. 
 
Table 2: Overview of the case-studies of the larger research-project 
                                             Internal Polarity 
 
 
                     High                                                  Low 
                         A 
 
Case: France 1982-1990 
 
                        B 
 
Case: Germany27 1982-1990 
 
Expectation: Internal considerations 
will be decisive 
 
 
 
 
 
External 
Polarity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
                         C 
 
Case: France 1990-1993 
 
Expectation: External considerations 
will be decisive 
                        D 
 
Case: Germany 1990-1993 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Germany has a low internal polarity due to its federal state structure (decentralization), its executive-legislative 
balance and its corporatist structure of interest representation. 
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In cases A and D, expectations based on either solely the external or solely the internal polarity 
are contradictory. In case A we would expect that internal considerations will eventually be 
decisive because the international system is stable and not highly constraining. Moreover, due to 
the governmental strength in relation to society, we would expect that internal ideological and 
economic considerations will play the greater role in the process of preference-formation. In Case 
D, the State is squashed between both external and internal constraints due to the low external 
and low internal polarity. This makes the case of Germany between 1990 and 1993, to which we 
will now turn, extremely interesting.28 
 
5.2. Introduction and expectations 
Regarding the issue of (agricultural) trade liberalization, Germany was divided between two 
traditions: a liberal free trade position, especially proponed by the Ministry of Economics; and 
the position of preserving the economic interests of the German farmers, defended by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Landau 1998, 7). The former lobby strived for liberalization of trade in 
all areas including agriculture, whereas the latter lobby aimed at minimizing the degree of 
liberalization in the area of agriculture. Between 1990 and 1993, within the framework of 
decision-making on the European position on agriculture in the Uruguay Round of GATT-
negotiations, Germany at some points in time defended the preference of liberalizing trade in 
agricultural products and at other moments clearly defended farm interests and tried to minimize 
liberalization in the area of agriculture. Two decision moments can be indicated at which a 
change in German preferences concerning the agricultural part of the Uruguay Round seems to 
have occurred. The first moment of change is the cabinet-meeting of the 9th of October 1991. 
Here the government decided that German priorities lie with the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, implying that possible concessions may need to be made in the area of 
agriculture in order to enable such a successful conclusion of the GATT-negotiations. This 
decision indicates a break with Germany’s staunch defense of the interest of farmers in prior 
decision-making on the European stance in the Uruguay Round. The second change in German 
preferences took place in august 1993. At a press-conference concluding a French-German 
summit, Chancellor Kohl stated that Germany also had problems with the Blair House Accord of 
                                                 
28 The expectations defined in this paragraph are solely based on structural variables: the power-relations between 
states and the power relations between state and government. We need to keep in mind that process variables may 
intervene in the expectations based on the structural variables and the actual outcome. 
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November 1992.29 This indicates a break with the earlier German approval of the Blair House 
Accord in November 1992. 
 Based on our argument in Sections 3 and 4 we expect that the changes in preference are 
likely to be the result of changes in a number of internal and external variables. Internal variables 
of which the changes are expected to lead to a change in preferences are: intensity and direction 
of mobilization, sensitivity of the government, composition of the government, and power 
relations within the government.30 Important external variables are: interaction capacity, intensity 
and direction of mobilization, vulnerability, economic stability, and relations with important 
trading partners. The analysis will show to what extent changes in these variables have taken 
place and if these changes can explain the changes in German preferences. 
 
5.3. The first change: The German cabinet-meeting of 9 November 1991 
As stated above, this cabinet-meeting indicates a change in German preferences in the sense that 
the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round is now prioritized over protecting the interests of 
farmers. In order to explain this change in preferences, we need to compare this decision-moment 
with the previous decision-moment in which Germany still preferred to defend farm interests, 
which was in the autumn of 1990 when the Council of Ministers had to decide on the mandate for 
the Commission with regard to the agricultural part of the Uruguay Round. We need to analyze to 
what extent changes have occurred in the relevant variables in the period between October 1990 
and October 1991 which can be expected to have led to changes in preferences. 
 In 1990 the German government was both confronted with intensive unidirectional 
societal mobilization (farmers) against liberalizing trade in agricultural products (DBK 11/1990, 
432-433; Bulletin 1990, 1322), and with intensive external pressure, mainly exerted by the US, in 
favour of liberalization. The US pointed out Germany’s interests as an export nation and further 
exerted pressure by proposing a Farm Bill that was likely to negatively effect the EU’s trade 
position and by striving for bilateral agreements and regional cooperation (NAFTA) at the cost of 
multilateralism (Agence Europe 22.1.1990/10; 10.3.1990/7).31 However, governmental 
                                                 
29 This was a deal between the EU and the US on the agricultural part of the Uruguay Round of GATT-negotiations. 
30 The latter two are likely to lead to changes in policy paradigms and changes in the balance of preferences within 
the government, which may eventually result in a change in the national preference. 
31 Germany attached great importance to mulilateralism, whereas the US interest in a multilateral trading system was 
smaller (which may be explained by the difference in their position in the international system see fn 25): the US 
‘threat’ was therefore credible. 
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sensitivity was high in this period, because the first all-German elections after unification were to 
be held in December 1990. Combined with the fact farmers were an important support group of 
de CDU/CSU/FDP coalition (Weiss 1989, 80-81), approving the mandate proposed by the 
Commission would be politically costly for the government. Moreover, the economic situation in 
Germany was thriving, creating no financial incentives for liberalizing trade in agricultural 
products and cutting back on agricultural support. Finally, the government’s causal belief was 
that the mandate32 proposed by the Commission would negatively affect employment in the 
agricultural sector and the ideal of the small-scale bäuerliche Landwirschaft (Agence Europe 
26.9.1990/7). Alltogether, the intensive and unilateral internal mobilization against the 
Commission proposal combined with the increased sensitivity of the government made the 
government decide to let its internal political considerations (supported by internal economic and 
ideological considerations) prevail over its external political considerations, despite the intensive 
US pressure.33 At the meetings of the Council of Ministers, Germany staunchly defended the 
interests of farmers and tried to prevent far-reaching liberalization of agricultural trade (Agence 
Europe 18/10/1990/5).34 
 In the end of 1991 the situation had changed in several respects. Internal mobilization was 
still intensive, but society was no longer united and different groups exerted contradictory 
pressure. Apart from the farm lobby, the industrial lobby had also started to mobilize, but they 
exerted pressure on the government to agree to liberalization in the area of agriculture in order to 
enable a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round (Landau 1998, 24). Moreover, the 
government was less sensitive now as no important elections were pending, and polls showed 
that the government enjoyed high support if elections were to be held and that electoral support 
would mainly depend on the issue of general employment (Europe Brief Notes: Germany mid-
november 1991). This corresponds with the economic stagnation in Germany and the cost of 
                                                 
32 The mandate contained an offer of 30% reduction in the three areas of internal support, external protection and 
export competition 
33 That the Gulf crisis erupted in the autumn of 1990 may also have affected preference-formation, but its potential 
effects are mixed. On the one hand, the crisis may have increased the consciousness of states of their 
interdependence, which could have led to incentives for further cooperation within the GATT. On the other hand, the 
crisis distracted the attention of Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the Uruguay Round at a result of which Ministers 
of Agriculture had great leeway, increasing the chances of demands from the farm lobby being met (BMWI 
Tagesnachrichten 11.1.1991/1-2) 
34 One source (Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 november 1990)states that Kohl is supposed to have given his negotiators 
the mandate ‘to support the French demands to the hill’. This seems to indicate that considerations of the Franco-
German relationship have played a role in the German preference to defend farm-interests. However, our empirical 
data are insufficient to warrant such a conclusion. 
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German reunification which led to a financial crisis. The government now changed its goals and 
priorities to safeguarding general employment instead of its previous focus on agricultural 
employment specifically. Furthermore, a change in the composition of the government and in the 
balance of preferences within the government had taken place. Economics Minister Haussman 
had been replaced by Mölleman who was a heave-weight within the liberal FDP and who 
advocated trade liberalization in the area of agriculture more intensively and radically. In addition 
Finance Minister Waigel, heavy-weight within the CSU, no longer supported CSU minister of 
Agriculture Kiechle, but shared Mölleman’s stance (Codebericht Buitenlandse Zaken 
14/12/1990). The changes in the direction of internal mobilization, the sensitivity of the 
government, the economic situation and the composition of and balance of preferences within the 
government (the latter three resulting in a change in governmental goals and priorities) explain 
the position the government took in its cabinet meeting of 9 October 1991. This decision seems 
to have been effective. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers, shortly after the cabinet-
decision, Mölleman stated that the coalition between France, Germany and Ireland would no 
longer inhibit an agreement between the EU and the VS (Vahl 1997, 160.35 The effect of the 
decision is also noticeable in December 1991 when GATT Secretary-General, Arthur Dunkel, 
presents his Draft Final Act. Although Germany does not favour the agricultural part of this draft, 
it no longer staunchly defends farm interests in the discussion in the Council of Ministers on 
whether or not to accept the Draft as a basis for negotiations (Agence Europa 23/24.12.1991). 
Germany leaves the defense of farm interests to the French delegation and even agrees to take the 
Draft as a basis for negotiations at the Council meeting of 10 January 1992. 
 
5.4. The second change: Kohl’s statements with regard to the Blair House Accord 
The German priority of successfully concluding the Uruguay Round instead of defending 
particularistic farm interests apparently still holds in November 1992 when Germany accepts the 
Blair House Accord, a bilateral deal between the EU and the US on the agricultural part of the 
Uruguay Round. Between October 1991 and November 1992 the pressure of domestic industrial 
groups had increased, and it was important for the government to pacify these groups because its 
                                                 
35 However, it must be noted that Kiechle defends a different position both nationally and in the international arena 
(which may be explained by the fact that power is dispersed within the German government which increases the role 
of bureaucratic politics, and is likely to be detrimental to the intensity and capacity with which Germany is able to 
defend a position in the international arena as it engenders contradictions in positions taken by different officials). 
Kiechle even argues that flexibilizing the position on agriculture would negatively affect Franco-German relations. 
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relations with employers and employees had worsened in the beginning of 1992 (Patterson 1997, 
156). Furthermore, the economic situation in Germany had further deteriorated. The government 
was worried about the economic conjuncture as it was confronted with a budget deficit and with 
an economic slowdown (Webber 19999, 54). Reaching an agreement in the Uruguay Round was 
now more economically important than ever (Patterson 1997, 160). Also, the government seemed 
to have come to the belief that a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round was impossible 
without European concessions on agriculture. In 1992, the pressure of the US also increased 
again. They threatened with sanctions in June and December and the vice-president stated that 
there was ‘an inevitable link between economic and military security’ (Financial Times 
10.2.1992).36 At the same time, however, France increased its pressure on Germany not to accept 
the Blair House Accord; the French government would fall if the EU were to approve of Blair 
House (Financial Times, 12 November 1992). A final change that needs to be mentioned is a 
change in the balance of preferences within the government. Kiechle himself now advised 
Chancellor Kohl to accept the Blair House Accord and not to follow the French demand to 
oppose the Accord, because French farm interests differed from German farm interests. In 
addition, this change in preference on the part of Kiechle can also be explained by the fact that 
due to the agreement on CAP-reform, reached in May 1992, the status quo had changed. 
Germany had already agreed to agricultural reforms within Europe, which were costly for 
German agriculture. As long as a GATT-deal remained within the limits of the CAP-reform, 
which the government believed that the Blair House Accord did, the GATT-deal would not 
confront Germany with additional costs. 
 Overall, the fact that the balance of internal mobilization tended more and more towards 
liberalization, the further deteriorating economic situation, and the change in the balance of 
governmental preferences can explain that the German government decided to prefer 
liberalization in the area of agriculture and to approve the Blair House Accord. External 
mobilization was clearly contradictory with the US increasing its pressure on the EU to do 
concessions in the area of agriculture, whereas France pressured Germany not to accept the Blair 
House Accord. Although Germany attached great importance to preserve the Franco-German 
relationship, the internal political and economic interests which would be served by reaching a 
                                                 
36 This ‘threat’ was made by Dan Quale in Februari 1992. He argued that if the GATT-talks failed, it would fuel 
protectionism and encourage those wanting to pull troops out of NATO.  
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successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the difference in interests of German and 
French agriculture seem to have made the government decide not to follow the French line, but to 
accept the Blair House Accord. Der Spiegel notes that Kohl had apparently authorized the liberal 
Economics Minister to oppose the French position for the first time (No 47, 16 November 1992, 
154). 
 The German preference in favour of accepting the Blair House Accord seems to have 
changed when Chancellor Kohl states, after a Franco-German summit in August 1993, that 
Germany also has problems with the Accord. This statement came to the unpleasant surprise of 
German Ministers, expect for the Agriculture Minister. This apparent change in preference begs 
the question of whether it can be explained by changes in the variables which are considered of 
importance in our theoretical model. No major changes had taken place in the internal 
mobilization between November 1992 and August 1993: there was still contradictory pressure 
from farmers and industry, with the balance tending toward pressure for liberalization. The 
composition of the government did change in January 1993: Kiechle was replaced by Borchert 
and Mölleman by Rexrodt. Borchert was less out-spoken and less known than Kiechle which was 
likely to negatively affect the position of the Ministry of Agriculture within the cabinet. In this 
respect, Paeman and Bench note that Borchert was no match for the FDP ministers Kinkel 
(Foreign Affairs) and Rexrodt (Economics) (Paeman and Bench 1995, 239-240). As the position 
of the Agriculture Minister had already weakened under Kiechle, it is questionable whether this 
change in composition of the government had great consequences. Nevertheless, if it had 
consequences, then the expectation would be that Germany would (perhaps even more stongly) 
keep taking a liberal position, whereas Kohl’s statement can be regarded as a preference for 
minimizing liberalization in the agricultural sector. The expectations based on the change in the 
composition of the government are therefore contradictory with the preference Kohl voiced in 
August 1993. Another variable in which a change took place was the external mobilization. The 
direct pressure of the US decreased as the US government was now mostly engaged getting 
government policy through Congress (e.g. the NAFTA agreement) (Paeman and Bench 1995, 
241). France, however, increased its pressure on Germany to support France in its demand of 
renegotiation of the Blair House Accord. Furthermore, the international economic situation 
changed due to a financial-monetary crisis within the EMS (European Monetary System). 
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 Exactly these last two changes in external pressure and economic situation are often used 
by authors to explain the German change in preferences. Allegedly, Kohl was convinced that the 
French government would indeed fall if the Blair House Accord was not changed and that the 
French government might use its veto in order to prevent a governmental crisis (Webber 1998a, 
52, Webber 1998b 584). If the French government were to fall, this would only increase the 
problems in the GATT-negotiations and it might jeopardize the process of European integration, 
to which Germany attached great importance. Next to the requirement of concessions in the area 
of agriculture in order to reach a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, an additional 
requirement now seemed to be, at least in the eyes of Kohl, conceding to the French who might 
otherwise block progress in the Uruguay Round even more. This explains the mandate Kohl gave 
to his negotiators in September 1993 to first of all aim at a successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, but to concede to French demands as much as possible as long as this would not 
jeopardize the Uruguay Round. The monetary crisis in the EMS is also supposed to have played 
an important role in the German change in preferences (Paeman and Bench 1995, 239-240). 
Germany wanted to obtain additional support measures from the European Union in relation to 
this monetary crisis, and it needed the support of France to succeed. Allegedly, France would 
support these proposals if Germany would support France in its demand of the renegotiation of 
Blair House. Although these factors may indeed explain Kohl’s statement that Germany also had 
problems with the Blair House Accord, it is still puzzling that he made this statement at a time 
that the balance of preferences within the government was clearly in favour of accepting the Blair 
House Accord as it stood.37 The conclusion that the external (French) pressure was decisive 
would – on the basis of the empirical material we have gathered so far, be too simple. Clearly, the 
personal preferences of Chancellor Kohl and his role and position within the government would 
deserve further attention if we want to explain the change in German preferences in August 1993. 
 At the Jumbo Council meeting of 20 September 1993, in which the issue of renegotiation 
of Blair House is discussed, the German delegation under the direction of FDP Foreign Affairs 
Minister Kinkel takes a stand against the French demands of renegotiations. Borchert does not 
agree, but he is overshadowed by Kinkel and Rexrodt. When the French decide to ask for 
‘clarification’ instead of renegotiation, the German delegation swings behind France and supports 
                                                 
37 Borchert was the only minister who was sympathetic to the French demands, for he feared that if France could not 
get concessions in the GATT-deal in relation to export subsidies, this would only lead to increased exports of French 
cereals to Germany. 
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their demands. Kohl’s personal envoy in Council meeting, Ludewig, is supposed to have played a 
great role in establishing this shift (Webber 1998b, 587). On the one hand, Germany’s plain 
rejection of the French demand of renegotiation could be taken as an indication that Kohl’s shift 
in August had been short-lived or even a ‘mistake’ made in the heat of the Franco-German 
summit. On the other hand, we can speak of continuity in the sense that Germany is willing to 
concede to the French demands as long as this is not expected to jeopardize the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Moreover, the fact that Kohl is supposed to have influenced 
the German swing during the Council meeting underscores the need to investigate his role within 
the government more thoroughly. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
With regard to the first change in German preferences in October 1991 we may conclude that this 
change can be explained by changes in the variables which were expected to be of importance in 
our model. However, thus far we have not actually applied external variables like the interaction 
capacity and state vulnerability in our analysis. On the one hand, this can be explained by the 
available empirical data used and the fact that these factors are not mentioned in secondary 
literature. On the other hand, it also makes us aware that we need to think more thoroughly on 
operationalizations of interaction capacity and vulnerability and on their concretely expected 
effects. With respect to the second change in German preferences it is less clear if our model 
provides a convincing explanation. External considerations seem to have been decisive38, but it 
remains puzzling that - in spite of internal mobilization and the balance in governmental 
preferences in favour of the Blair House Accord - Kohl decided to state that Germany also had 
problems with Blair House. Finally, it is striking that where the German preference for defending 
farm interests until the end of 1990 was clearly instigated by internal pressure of agricultural 
groups, decisions to defend farm interests from 1991 onwards seem to have been instigated not 
by internal pressure from farmers anymore, but by external pressure from France. The general 
belief that German farm groups have been very influential in German decision making on 
agriculture in the Uruguay Round therefore has to be reconsidered. 
                                                 
38 Which is in line with the expectation that under low external polarity external interests will be of greater 
importance in the process of preference-formation. 
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Appendix 1: Dimensions and operationalisations of Germany’s interests 
 
EXTERNAL INTERNAL 
Political material interest 
 
Defending the power position of the state and 
preventing vulnerability of the state to other states. 
 
Considerations for preference formation 
- Consequences of the policy options for the 
relationship with important (trading) 
partners: German-French, German-EU, 
German-VS and EU-VS relations. 
- Consequences of the policy options for 
peaceful/stable interactions between states 
in the international system: preventing 
(trade) wars. 
- Consequences of the policy options for the 
position of the GATT multilateral trade 
regime and the EU, the membership to 
which has been very beneficial for the 
(German) state in the past.. 
 
Political material interest 
 
Remaining in office (reelection) and defending the 
government’s position in relation to society. 
 
Considerations for preference formation 
- Consequences of policy options for degree 
of support of the farm-community, industry 
and employees for the government. 
- Consequences of policy options for the 
chances of reelection. 
- Consequences of policy options for the 
political stability inside the state: 
preventing mass demonstrations and 
societal disobedience. 
Pol. immaterial (reputational) interest 
 
Defending the state’s credibility and reputation 
 
Considerations for preference formation: 
- Consequences of policy options for the 
ability of the state to keep (agricultural) 
trade-related promises and execute threats 
it has made in the context of GATT, G7, 
OECD or bilaterally. 
 
Pol. Immaterial (reputational) interest  
 
Defending the government’s credibility and 
reputation 
 
Considerations for preference formation: 
- Consequences of policy options for the 
ability of the government to keep 
(agricultural) trade-related promises and 
execute threats it made in the national 
arena: promises of improved export 
opportunities and promises of a minimum 
amount of protection. 
 
Economic interest 
 
Maximizing gains from production and trade by 
striving for protectionism in non-competitive 
sectors and liberalization in competitive sectors + 
maintaining a viable international trading system 
 
Considerations for preference formation: 
- Consequences of a policy option for the 
degree of liberalization in the non-
competitive sector of agriculture and the 
competitive sector of industry. 
- Consequences of a policy option for the 
state’s and the EU’s trade balance 
- Consequences of a policy option for a 
state’s and the EU’s comparative 
Economic interest 
 
Maximizing national economic indicators. 
 
Considerations for preference formation: 
- Consequences of a policy option for the 
Gross National Product. 
- Consequences of a policy options for 
employment. 
- Consequences of policy options for the 
state budget.  
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competitiveness 
- Consequences of a policy option for the 
maintenance of a viable (GATT) trading 
system providing stability in the 
international economy. 
 
Ideological interest 
 
Playing the ideological ‘role’ the state wishes to 
play in the international system. 
  
Considerations for preference formation: 
- Degree to which policy option is 
compatible with and enables the state to 
play the role the state assigns itself in the 
international system. E.g. for Germany: 
Germany as an industrial trading nation; a 
strong Germany within a strong EU; the 
Franco-German ‘conciliation’. 
 
Ideological interest 
 
Defending the state’s principled beliefs and policy 
paradigm (instruments and policies). 
 
Considerations for preference formation: 
- Degree to which policy options are 
compatible with a state’s principles in the  
area of agricultural trade. E.g. for 
Germany: Leistungsprinzip; Bauerliche 
Landwirtschaft; Agriculture cannot be 
compared to industry and is entitled to a 
minimum degree of protection. 
- Degree to which policy options are 
compatible with the state’s instruments and 
policies in the area of agricultural trade. 
E.g. for Germany: stabilizing markets and 
prices by production cuts. 
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